Phase 2: disaster recovery (occ backup:restore:full)

New commands, per PLAN.md 3.7:
- occ backup:key:import: adopt the master key from a recovery kit on a fresh installation
  (instead of occ backup:key:init generating a new one), so occ backup:target:add opens the
  existing repository on the location rather than creating an empty one.
- occ backup:restore:full: replace the database (consistent, one transaction), restore the data
  directory in place, and merge config.php -- refuses up front and lists what's missing when the
  Nextcloud major version or any app enabled at backup time doesn't match here (their tables must
  exist before the database restore can use them), rather than guessing or partially applying.

Repository::restore() gained an optional $stripPrefix (write "data/<uid>/..." straight into the
real data directory, not a "data/" subdirectory of it) -- restoring "data/" and "config/" this way
needs no temporary copy of what can be the largest part of an instance.

occ backup:target:add now backfills the local snapshot cache (ngb_snapshots, what occ backup:list
actually reads) when it adopts an existing repository: without this, a freshly connected location
showed no restore points at all, even though the repository itself had them. One unreadable
snapshot is skipped rather than aborting the backfill or the target add itself.

Three self-referential problems found and fixed by testing this against two real, separate
Nextcloud instances sharing only the backup location (tests/integration/full-restore-roundtrip.sh
covers this; the per-process nature of these bugs meant they were invisible from inside a single
occ invocation, including the one used to write the fixes, which is exactly why a second, fresh
process re-running occ backup:status etc. was necessary to catch them):
- The full database dump includes ng_backup's own tables and appconfig rows; restoring them
  verbatim would overwrite the key/target that is actively performing the restore, on THIS
  installation, with the backed-up instance's. Both are now preserved: ng_backup's own tables
  (and, on PostgreSQL, their sequences -- excluding a table does not exclude its sequence) are
  excluded from what gets restored, and its appconfig rows are captured before the database
  restore and written back after, in their own transaction.
- config.php's 'secret' is merged in from the backup (needed so already-encrypted content in the
  restored database, e.g. share tokens, stays decryptable), but Target::options, the master key,
  the wrapped key and the recovery kit code are all encrypted with that same instance secret
  (OCP's ICrypto, or Nextcloud AppConfig's own "sensitive" flag underneath), not with ng_backup's
  own key. Changing it without re-encrypting them first left all four permanently undecryptable
  the moment any later occ command ran. Fixed with two helpers
  (TargetService::reencryptOptionsAround(), KeyService::reencryptForSecretRotation()) that decrypt
  before and re-encrypt after whatever callback actually changes the secret; config.php is applied
  dead last in restoreFull(), after every other repository access. Not crash-safe (a process kill
  mid-rotation would leave a key missing, not just stale) -- disaster recovery is run once by
  hand, right after occ maintenance:install, a window too narrow yet to justify a two-phase write.
- A subtler variant of the same bug: Nextcloud's own AppConfig additionally encrypts a "sensitive"
  value itself, tied to the same secret, underneath our own encryption. Overwriting an existing
  sensitive key makes it read the old value first to compare, which then also fails against the
  new secret. Deleting the key before setting the new value avoids that read entirely.

Roadmap (PLAN.md 9): phase 3 (in-place full restore, user self-service) moved out to v1.3.0; phase
2 continues toward v1.2.0 with FTP/SMB, a verification/checksum-audit command, user-export
retention, and deciding whether per-user export joins the automatic schedule.

lib/Service/KeyService.php

@@ -71,6 +71,84 @@ final class KeyService {
 		$this->cached = $keys;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Disaster recovery on a fresh installation: adopt the master key from a recovery kit
+	 * (occ backup:key:kit on the original installation) instead of generating a new one.
+	 * Afterwards occ backup:target:add opens the existing repository on the location with this
+	 * key, instead of creating a new, empty one.
+	 *
+	 * @param array<string, mixed> $kit as produced by recoveryKit()
+	 * @throws \OCA\NgBackup\Crypto\CryptoException wrong passphrase, or a damaged/foreign kit
+	 */
+	public function importRecoveryKit(array $kit, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $passphrase): void {
+		if ($this->isInitialized()) {
+			throw new \RuntimeException('A backup key already exists');
+		}
+		if (!isset($kit['wrapped_key'])) {
+			throw new \InvalidArgumentException('Not a NG Backup recovery kit file');
+		}
+		$keys = KeyRing::unwrapAny($kit['wrapped_key'], $passphrase);
+		$this->appConfig->setValueString(Application::APP_ID, self::KEY_MASTER,
+			$this->crypto->encrypt(base64_encode($keys->exportMasterKey())), true, true);
+		$this->cached = $keys;
+		$this->appConfig->setValueString(Application::APP_ID, self::KEY_WRAPPED, json_encode($kit['wrapped_key'], JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR), true, true);
+		$this->appConfig->setValueString(Application::APP_ID, self::KEY_FINGERPRINT, $this->fingerprintOf($keys), true);
+		$this->appConfig->setValueInt(Application::APP_ID, self::KEY_DELETE_DELAY, self::DEFAULT_DELETE_DELAY, true);
+		$this->appConfig->setValueInt(Application::APP_ID, self::KEY_KIT_VERSION, (int)($kit['kit_version'] ?? 1), true);
+		// Having and successfully using a real kit file is stronger proof than the normal
+		// download-and-confirm flow it replaces.
+		$this->confirmRecoveryKit('cli-import');
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * The master key and the recovery kit code are stored encrypted with Nextcloud's own
+	 * instance secret (ICrypto), not with themselves; the wrapped key is not (it is sealed with
+	 * the admin's passphrase instead), but Nextcloud's own AppConfig additionally encrypts any
+	 * "sensitive" value with the instance secret regardless, underneath whatever we store. So
+	 * changing that secret (occ backup:restore:full merging config.php) would otherwise leave
+	 * all three permanently undecryptable. Call $applySecretChange (which must be the only thing
+	 * that changes the secret) through here instead: all three are decrypted first, then
+	 * re-encrypted under whatever secret is active once $applySecretChange returns.
+	 *
+	 * Not crash-safe: a process kill between the delete and the re-save of one of these keys
+	 * would leave it missing rather than merely stale. Disaster recovery is run once, by hand,
+	 * right after occ maintenance:install; a dedicated two-phase write is not justified yet for
+	 * that narrow a window.
+	 */
+	public function reencryptForSecretRotation(callable $applySecretChange): mixed {
+		$master = $this->appConfig->getValueString(Application::APP_ID, self::KEY_MASTER, '', true);
+		$wrapped = $this->appConfig->getValueString(Application::APP_ID, self::KEY_WRAPPED, '', true);
+		$kitCodeRaw = $this->appConfig->getValueString(Application::APP_ID, self::KEY_KIT_CODE, '', true);
+		$kitCode = $kitCodeRaw !== '' ? json_decode($kitCodeRaw, true, 512, JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR) : null;
+		$masterPlain = $master !== '' ? $this->crypto->decrypt($master) : null;
+		$kitCodePlain = $kitCode !== null && isset($kitCode['code']) ? $this->crypto->decrypt($kitCode['code']) : null;
+
+		$result = $applySecretChange();
+		$this->cached = null; // the master key is about to be re-saved; do not keep the pre-rotation copy
+
+		// Nextcloud's own AppConfig additionally encrypts a "sensitive" value itself (tied to
+		// the same secret, underneath our own encrypt() above); setValueString() on an existing
+		// key reads the old value first to compare, which would try to decrypt it with the new
+		// secret and fail the same way. Delete first so there is nothing to compare against.
+		if ($masterPlain !== null) {
+			$this->appConfig->deleteKey(Application::APP_ID, self::KEY_MASTER);
+			$this->appConfig->setValueString(Application::APP_ID, self::KEY_MASTER, $this->crypto->encrypt($masterPlain), true, true);
+		}
+		if ($wrapped !== '') {
+			// Already plaintext JSON here: getValueString() above transparently undid
+			// AppConfig's own sensitive-value encryption; there is no encrypt() of our own to
+			// redo (wrapping is sealed with the passphrase, not the instance secret).
+			$this->appConfig->deleteKey(Application::APP_ID, self::KEY_WRAPPED);
+			$this->appConfig->setValueString(Application::APP_ID, self::KEY_WRAPPED, $wrapped, true, true);
+		}
+		if ($kitCodePlain !== null) {
+			$kitCode['code'] = $this->crypto->encrypt($kitCodePlain);
+			$this->appConfig->deleteKey(Application::APP_ID, self::KEY_KIT_CODE);
+			$this->appConfig->setValueString(Application::APP_ID, self::KEY_KIT_CODE, json_encode($kitCode, JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR), true, true);
+		}
+		return $result;
+	}
+
 	public function keyRing(): KeyRing {
 		if ($this->cached === null) {
 			$enc = $this->appConfig->getValueString(Application::APP_ID, self::KEY_MASTER, '', true);