- Unreadable settings or an invalid delay on the location: 365 days, so nothing leaves the Bin sooner than on the old server
- A passphrase change that still cannot reach a location is logged; removing a location clears its flag
- A damaged slot (missing parts, invalid base64) is skipped and the next slot is tried
- Tests: damaged settings scenario, damaged slot, upgrade test checks the migration and the time zone
- backup:restore:full refuses on an installation with more than one user
and asks before it starts (--force skips both, also to rerun after a
failure halfway), and warns when the snapshot's database dump was not
one consistent transaction.
- backup:user:restore --mode=replace asks before deleting an existing
account; non-interactive use needs --force.
- The recovery kit file is created owner-only and never over an existing
file or symlink; backup:key:import shows the deletion delay it read from
the kit.
- Adding a location through the web API needs password confirmation, like
removing one.
- Key derivation parameters from a kit or repository config are bounded,
and a stalled network stream no longer spins at full CPU.
- Floating-point columns are dumped exactly instead of with 14 digits.
RepositoryImportSource::copyToFolder() called putContent() on the generic
return type of Node::get(), which doesn't declare that method -- only
File does. Existing-file overwrite during a per-user restore would have
fatally errored at runtime; added an instanceof check and a resource leak
fix (finally-close) while there. Also guarded getFileAsStream() against
fopen() returning false.
Everything else Psalm (strict level) currently flags is mechanical
(missing `final` on leaf classes -- applied everywhere safe) or pre-existing
array-shape/type gaps, captured in psalm-baseline.xml so CI fails only on
new issues from here on, not the whole backlog at once.
- removed snapshots go to a trash on the location and their data is only
freed after the deletion delay, which is chosen when the key is created
(default 7 days, 1-365) and cannot be changed afterwards; any admin can
bring them back (occ backup:trash, backup:trash:restore, web UI)
- up to three passphrase slots open the same master key (like LUKS), so
one person leaving or dying does not lock the company out; slot changes
are written to every location, announced to all admins and require a
new recovery kit confirmation, while backups keep running
- occ backup:key:slots, backup:key:slot:add|replace|remove; key init takes
--label and --delete-delay-days
- web UI: deletion delay and first slot at key creation, slot management,
trash per location with restore; all behind password confirmation
- README: key, slots (safe / CTO / head of IT), and protection against
ransomware: object lock in compliance mode (e.g. 90 days), credentials
without delete rights, provider snapshots, off-site copy
- migration: ngb_targets, ngb_runs, ngb_snapshots
- KeyService: master key stored encrypted with the instance secret
(unattended backups), passphrase-wrapped copy in every repository and
in the recovery kit, recorded admin confirmation per key fingerprint
- TargetService: locations built from files_external backends without a
mount; files_external is loaded through IAppManager::loadApp() and its
enabled state is left alone; credentials encrypted with ICrypto;
existing repositories are adopted only if made with this key, and a
repository cannot be registered twice
- Repository: initWithKey/openWithKey with an encrypted key check
- occ: backup:key:init|kit|confirm, backup:target:backends|add|list|remove
dillard