3 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
dillard	fe7ad9b4b5	Verify: report read errors as unreadable, not as corrupted ... verifyBlob() caught every exception from loading a blob and counted it as a failed (corrupted or tampered) blob, so a transient network error during a deep verify over WebDAV looked like data corruption. Read the range separately, retry it, and report a read that keeps failing as unreadable with its error; only a blob that was read but does not decrypt or match its id counts as failed.	2026-10-08 00:53:31 +02:00
dillard	d70a869070	Phase 2: verify per-user exports, refuse SMB without the native extension, matrix user CI ... backup:verify accepts a user export path (users/<uid>/<export>): every blob its manifest references is checked the same way as for a snapshot, shallow or --deep. The SMB backend is refused at backup:target:add when the native smbclient PECL extension is not loaded, instead of registering and then failing the first backup with "Seek failed": with only the smbclient binary files_external falls back to a shell stream that cannot seek. The per-user integration job now runs on Nextcloud 32-35, not just 35: it calls user_migration's internal UserMigrationService, whose API may change between versions.	2026-10-06 03:47:02 +02:00
dillard	935c7b6a08	Phase 2: checksum audit (occ backup:verify) ... Repository::verify(): every blob a snapshot's files and database dump reference must be in a freshly re-downloaded, re-authenticated index (never trusted from the local cache, same reasoning as prune()) and have its pack still present on the location -- shallow, cheap, no blob content read, catches a deleted pack, a tampered/rolled-back index, or a database manifest that went missing (reported as a failure, not silently skipped). With $deep, each blob is also downloaded and decrypted, same as loadBlob() already does on every real read (AEAD authentication tag, content hash against its blob id), done here deliberately for everything in the snapshot rather than waiting for it to come up during an actual restore. A blob referenced by more than one file is only checked once; pack presence is cached per pack, not re-checked per blob. occ backup:verify <target> <snapshot> [--deep], meant to run periodically (cron, a sample of recent snapshots), per PLAN.md's "Verificatie: periodiek checksums controleren, steekproef-restore". The lease covering the audit is refreshed roughly every half of its TTL while blobs are checked, rather than relying on a single long-lived lease like the other new phase-2 commands do. Verified against a real S3-backed 1.4 GiB / 603-blob snapshot (shallow: instant; --deep: ~28s, fully decrypted) in addition to the new unit tests and the roundtrip.sh addition (shallow and deep on a snapshot with real, varied file sizes, now covered on every CI matrix combination). Local review (Codex) on the first pass found three real issues, all fixed: a missing database manifest was silently skipped instead of reported; shallow verification trusted the (possibly stale or unauthenticated) local index cache instead of re-checking the authenticated index on the location; and the lease had no refresh, so a --deep audit of a very large snapshot could outrun its TTL and run unprotected against a concurrent prune.	2026-10-05 23:56:16 +02:00