nextcloud-ng_backup

Ensembia/nextcloud-ng_backup

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Commit Graph

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
dillard	9b03f98d0d	M5: deletion delay with trash, passphrase slots, ransomware documentation - removed snapshots go to a trash on the location and their data is only freed after the deletion delay, which is chosen when the key is created (default 7 days, 1-365) and cannot be changed afterwards; any admin can bring them back (occ backup:trash, backup:trash:restore, web UI) - up to three passphrase slots open the same master key (like LUKS), so one person leaving or dying does not lock the company out; slot changes are written to every location, announced to all admins and require a new recovery kit confirmation, while backups keep running - occ backup:key:slots, backup:key:slot:add\|replace\|remove; key init takes --label and --delete-delay-days - web UI: deletion delay and first slot at key creation, slot management, trash per location with restore; all behind password confirmation - README: key, slots (safe / CTO / head of IT), and protection against ransomware: object lock in compliance mode (e.g. 90 days), credentials without delete rights, provider snapshots, off-site copy	2026-10-02 03:01:44 +02:00
dillard	fee189aec3	Phase 0: skeleton, streaming encryption (spike A) Repository skeleton (app id ng_backup, AGPL-3.0-or-later), KeyRing with KDF subkeys, keyed blob ids and Argon2id key wrapping, and StreamCipher (secretstream XChaCha20-Poly1305, framed, bounded memory). Spike A: 1 GiB round trip with memory_limit=64M, peak < 2 MiB, ~160/122 MiB/s; tampering, truncation, wrong key/passphrase are rejected.	2026-10-01 18:15:24 +02:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

dillard

9b03f98d0d

M5: deletion delay with trash, passphrase slots, ransomware documentation

- removed snapshots go to a trash on the location and their data is only
  freed after the deletion delay, which is chosen when the key is created
  (default 7 days, 1-365) and cannot be changed afterwards; any admin can
  bring them back (occ backup:trash, backup:trash:restore, web UI)
- up to three passphrase slots open the same master key (like LUKS), so
  one person leaving or dying does not lock the company out; slot changes
  are written to every location, announced to all admins and require a
  new recovery kit confirmation, while backups keep running
- occ backup:key:slots, backup:key:slot:add|replace|remove; key init takes
  --label and --delete-delay-days
- web UI: deletion delay and first slot at key creation, slot management,
  trash per location with restore; all behind password confirmation
- README: key, slots (safe / CTO / head of IT), and protection against
  ransomware: object lock in compliance mode (e.g. 90 days), credentials
  without delete rights, provider snapshots, off-site copy

2026-10-02 03:01:44 +02:00

dillard

fee189aec3

Phase 0: skeleton, streaming encryption (spike A)

Repository skeleton (app id ng_backup, AGPL-3.0-or-later), KeyRing with
KDF subkeys, keyed blob ids and Argon2id key wrapping, and StreamCipher
(secretstream XChaCha20-Poly1305, framed, bounded memory).

Spike A: 1 GiB round trip with memory_limit=64M, peak < 2 MiB, ~160/122
MiB/s; tampering, truncation, wrong key/passphrase are rejected.

2026-10-01 18:15:24 +02:00

2 Commits