7 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
dillard	2a72acb70b	Review fixes: the derived key is wiped also when a key is damaged, each tidy-up step after a removal on its own ... - The key derived from the passphrase is wiped on every path, also when the key or nonce turns out damaged - After a removal the pending flag and the cached index are tidied up independently; a failing log cannot stop the removal event - Tests: a short salt or nonce gives the damaged-key error	2026-11-09 02:33:50 +01:00
dillard	fb8e8d0694	Review fixes: a malformed key reads as damaged, removing a location always reports it, a key from before 1.1.0 in the recovery guide ... - Invalid base64 or a wrong salt/nonce length in a key gives the damaged-key error, so the recovery options are shown - Tidying up after a removed location cannot fail the removal anymore, so the removal event is always sent - Recovery guide: a key made before 1.1.0 counts as used and cannot make way	2026-11-09 00:55:20 +01:00
dillard	042fdae686	Review fixes: the longest deletion delay when the location's settings cannot be read, a damaged passphrase slot does not stop the next one ... - Unreadable settings or an invalid delay on the location: 365 days, so nothing leaves the Bin sooner than on the old server - A passphrase change that still cannot reach a location is logged; removing a location clears its flag - A damaged slot (missing parts, invalid base64) is skipped and the next slot is tried - Tests: damaged settings scenario, damaged slot, upgrade test checks the migration and the time zone	2026-11-08 18:29:31 +01:00
dillard	45069994e9	Pre-beta review: safer destructive commands and hardening ... - backup:restore:full refuses on an installation with more than one user and asks before it starts (--force skips both, also to rerun after a failure halfway), and warns when the snapshot's database dump was not one consistent transaction. - backup:user:restore --mode=replace asks before deleting an existing account; non-interactive use needs --force. - The recovery kit file is created owner-only and never over an existing file or symlink; backup:key:import shows the deletion delay it read from the kit. - Adding a location through the web API needs password confirmation, like removing one. - Key derivation parameters from a kit or repository config are bounded, and a stalled network stream no longer spins at full CPU. - Floating-point columns are dumped exactly instead of with 14 digits.	2026-10-06 23:48:41 +02:00
dillard	d3aa07b106	M5: deletion delay with trash, passphrase slots, ransomware documentation ... - removed snapshots go to a trash on the location and their data is only freed after the deletion delay, which is chosen when the key is created (default 7 days, 1-365) and cannot be changed afterwards; any admin can bring them back (occ backup:trash, backup:trash:restore, web UI) - up to three passphrase slots open the same master key (like LUKS), so one person leaving or dying does not lock the company out; slot changes are written to every location, announced to all admins and require a new recovery kit confirmation, while backups keep running - occ backup:key:slots, backup:key:slot:add|replace|remove; key init takes --label and --delete-delay-days - web UI: deletion delay and first slot at key creation, slot management, trash per location with restore; all behind password confirmation - README: key, slots (safe / CTO / head of IT), and protection against ransomware: object lock in compliance mode (e.g. 90 days), credentials without delete rights, provider snapshots, off-site copy	2026-10-02 03:01:44 +02:00
dillard	506854d597	M1: key management, backup locations and occ commands ... - migration: ngb_targets, ngb_runs, ngb_snapshots - KeyService: master key stored encrypted with the instance secret (unattended backups), passphrase-wrapped copy in every repository and in the recovery kit, recorded admin confirmation per key fingerprint - TargetService: locations built from files_external backends without a mount; files_external is loaded through IAppManager::loadApp() and its enabled state is left alone; credentials encrypted with ICrypto; existing repositories are adopted only if made with this key, and a repository cannot be registered twice - Repository: initWithKey/openWithKey with an encrypted key check - occ: backup:key:init|kit|confirm, backup:target:backends|add|list|remove	2026-10-02 00:37:18 +02:00
dillard	07e3d263b4	Phase 0: skeleton, streaming encryption (spike A) ... Repository skeleton (app id ng_backup, AGPL-3.0-or-later), KeyRing with KDF subkeys, keyed blob ids and Argon2id key wrapping, and StreamCipher (secretstream XChaCha20-Poly1305, framed, bounded memory). Spike A: 1 GiB round trip with memory_limit=64M, peak < 2 MiB, ~160/122 MiB/s; tampering, truncation, wrong key/passphrase are rejected.	2026-10-01 18:15:24 +02:00