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Pre-beta review: safer destructive commands and hardening
- backup:restore:full refuses on an installation with more than one user
  and asks before it starts (--force skips both, also to rerun after a
  failure halfway), and warns when the snapshot's database dump was not
  one consistent transaction.
- backup:user:restore --mode=replace asks before deleting an existing
  account; non-interactive use needs --force.
- The recovery kit file is created owner-only and never over an existing
  file or symlink; backup:key:import shows the deletion delay it read from
  the kit.
- Adding a location through the web API needs password confirmation, like
  removing one.
- Key derivation parameters from a kit or repository config are bounded,
  and a stalled network stream no longer spins at full CPU.
- Floating-point columns are dumped exactly instead of with 14 digits.
2026-10-06 23:48:41 +02:00

121 lines
4.6 KiB
PHP

<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Dillard Blom
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
namespace OCA\NgBackup\Crypto;
/**
* Holds the repository master key and derives the subkeys used for encryption and for the
* keyed blob hashes. The master key never leaves this object unencrypted, except through
* wrap(), which seals it with a key derived from the admin's passphrase.
*/
final class KeyRing {
private const KDF_CONTEXT = 'ngbackup';
private const SUBKEY_DATA = 1;
private const SUBKEY_HASH = 2;
private string $dataKey;
private string $hashKey;
public function __construct(
#[\SensitiveParameter]
private string $masterKey,
) {
if (strlen($masterKey) !== SODIUM_CRYPTO_KDF_KEYBYTES) {
throw new \InvalidArgumentException('Master key must be ' . SODIUM_CRYPTO_KDF_KEYBYTES . ' bytes');
}
$this->dataKey = sodium_crypto_kdf_derive_from_key(
SODIUM_CRYPTO_SECRETSTREAM_XCHACHA20POLY1305_KEYBYTES, self::SUBKEY_DATA, self::KDF_CONTEXT, $masterKey);
$this->hashKey = sodium_crypto_kdf_derive_from_key(
SODIUM_CRYPTO_GENERICHASH_KEYBYTES, self::SUBKEY_HASH, self::KDF_CONTEXT, $masterKey);
}
public static function generate(): self {
return new self(sodium_crypto_kdf_keygen());
}
/** Raw master key, only for storing it encrypted on the server (ICrypto). */
public function exportMasterKey(): string {
return $this->masterKey;
}
public function dataKey(): string {
return $this->dataKey;
}
/** Keyed BLAKE2b of plaintext, so blob ids reveal nothing about the content. */
public function blobId(string $plaintext): string {
return sodium_bin2hex(sodium_crypto_generichash($plaintext, $this->hashKey, 32));
}
/**
* Seal the master key with a passphrase (Argon2id). The result is what goes into the
* repository config and the recovery kit.
*
* @return array{v:int, salt:string, ops:int, mem:int, nonce:string, key:string}
*/
public function wrap(#[\SensitiveParameter] string $passphrase): array {
$salt = random_bytes(SODIUM_CRYPTO_PWHASH_SALTBYTES);
$ops = SODIUM_CRYPTO_PWHASH_OPSLIMIT_MODERATE;
$mem = SODIUM_CRYPTO_PWHASH_MEMLIMIT_MODERATE;
$kek = sodium_crypto_pwhash(SODIUM_CRYPTO_SECRETBOX_KEYBYTES, $passphrase, $salt, $ops, $mem,
SODIUM_CRYPTO_PWHASH_ALG_ARGON2ID13);
$nonce = random_bytes(SODIUM_CRYPTO_SECRETBOX_NONCEBYTES);
$sealed = sodium_crypto_secretbox($this->masterKey, $nonce, $kek);
sodium_memzero($kek);
return [
'v' => 1,
'salt' => sodium_bin2base64($salt, SODIUM_BASE64_VARIANT_ORIGINAL),
'ops' => $ops,
'mem' => $mem,
'nonce' => sodium_bin2base64($nonce, SODIUM_BASE64_VARIANT_ORIGINAL),
'key' => sodium_bin2base64($sealed, SODIUM_BASE64_VARIANT_ORIGINAL),
];
}
/**
* Open a key field that is either one wrapped key or {"slots": [{slot, label, key}, ...]}:
* every slot holds the same master key under its own passphrase.
*/
public static function unwrapAny(array $field, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $passphrase): self {
if (!isset($field['slots'])) {
return self::unwrap($field, $passphrase);
}
foreach ($field['slots'] as $slot) {
try {
return self::unwrap($slot['key'], $passphrase);
} catch (CryptoException) {
}
}
throw new CryptoException('Wrong passphrase or damaged key');
}
/** @param array{v:int, salt:string, ops:int, mem:int, nonce:string, key:string} $wrapped */
public static function unwrap(array $wrapped, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $passphrase): self {
$b64 = static fn (string $s): string => sodium_base642bin($s, SODIUM_BASE64_VARIANT_ORIGINAL);
// ops/mem come from unauthenticated JSON (kit file, repository config): bound them, so a
// damaged or crafted file cannot make the KDF use unbounded memory or time.
if ($wrapped['ops'] < SODIUM_CRYPTO_PWHASH_OPSLIMIT_INTERACTIVE || $wrapped['ops'] > SODIUM_CRYPTO_PWHASH_OPSLIMIT_SENSITIVE
|| $wrapped['mem'] < SODIUM_CRYPTO_PWHASH_MEMLIMIT_INTERACTIVE || $wrapped['mem'] > SODIUM_CRYPTO_PWHASH_MEMLIMIT_SENSITIVE) {
throw new CryptoException('Unsupported key derivation parameters (damaged or foreign key file)');
}
$kek = sodium_crypto_pwhash(SODIUM_CRYPTO_SECRETBOX_KEYBYTES, $passphrase, $b64($wrapped['salt']),
$wrapped['ops'], $wrapped['mem'], SODIUM_CRYPTO_PWHASH_ALG_ARGON2ID13);
$master = sodium_crypto_secretbox_open($b64($wrapped['key']), $b64($wrapped['nonce']), $kek);
sodium_memzero($kek);
if ($master === false) {
throw new CryptoException('Wrong passphrase or damaged key');
}
return new self($master);
}
public function __destruct() {
sodium_memzero($this->masterKey);
sodium_memzero($this->dataKey);
sodium_memzero($this->hashKey);
}
}