d3aa07b106
- removed snapshots go to a trash on the location and their data is only freed after the deletion delay, which is chosen when the key is created (default 7 days, 1-365) and cannot be changed afterwards; any admin can bring them back (occ backup:trash, backup:trash:restore, web UI) - up to three passphrase slots open the same master key (like LUKS), so one person leaving or dying does not lock the company out; slot changes are written to every location, announced to all admins and require a new recovery kit confirmation, while backups keep running - occ backup:key:slots, backup:key:slot:add|replace|remove; key init takes --label and --delete-delay-days - web UI: deletion delay and first slot at key creation, slot management, trash per location with restore; all behind password confirmation - README: key, slots (safe / CTO / head of IT), and protection against ransomware: object lock in compliance mode (e.g. 90 days), credentials without delete rights, provider snapshots, off-site copy
115 lines
4.1 KiB
PHP
115 lines
4.1 KiB
PHP
<?php
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declare(strict_types=1);
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// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Dillard Blom
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
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namespace OCA\NgBackup\Crypto;
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/**
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* Holds the repository master key and derives the subkeys used for encryption and for the
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* keyed blob hashes. The master key never leaves this object unencrypted, except through
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* wrap(), which seals it with a key derived from the admin's passphrase.
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*/
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final class KeyRing {
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private const KDF_CONTEXT = 'ngbackup';
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private const SUBKEY_DATA = 1;
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private const SUBKEY_HASH = 2;
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private string $dataKey;
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private string $hashKey;
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public function __construct(
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#[\SensitiveParameter]
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private string $masterKey,
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) {
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if (strlen($masterKey) !== SODIUM_CRYPTO_KDF_KEYBYTES) {
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throw new \InvalidArgumentException('Master key must be ' . SODIUM_CRYPTO_KDF_KEYBYTES . ' bytes');
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}
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$this->dataKey = sodium_crypto_kdf_derive_from_key(
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SODIUM_CRYPTO_SECRETSTREAM_XCHACHA20POLY1305_KEYBYTES, self::SUBKEY_DATA, self::KDF_CONTEXT, $masterKey);
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$this->hashKey = sodium_crypto_kdf_derive_from_key(
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SODIUM_CRYPTO_GENERICHASH_KEYBYTES, self::SUBKEY_HASH, self::KDF_CONTEXT, $masterKey);
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}
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public static function generate(): self {
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return new self(sodium_crypto_kdf_keygen());
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}
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/** Raw master key, only for storing it encrypted on the server (ICrypto). */
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public function exportMasterKey(): string {
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return $this->masterKey;
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}
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public function dataKey(): string {
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return $this->dataKey;
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}
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/** Keyed BLAKE2b of plaintext, so blob ids reveal nothing about the content. */
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public function blobId(string $plaintext): string {
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return sodium_bin2hex(sodium_crypto_generichash($plaintext, $this->hashKey, 32));
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}
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/**
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* Seal the master key with a passphrase (Argon2id). The result is what goes into the
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* repository config and the recovery kit.
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*
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* @return array{v:int, salt:string, ops:int, mem:int, nonce:string, key:string}
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*/
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public function wrap(#[\SensitiveParameter] string $passphrase): array {
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$salt = random_bytes(SODIUM_CRYPTO_PWHASH_SALTBYTES);
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$ops = SODIUM_CRYPTO_PWHASH_OPSLIMIT_MODERATE;
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$mem = SODIUM_CRYPTO_PWHASH_MEMLIMIT_MODERATE;
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$kek = sodium_crypto_pwhash(SODIUM_CRYPTO_SECRETBOX_KEYBYTES, $passphrase, $salt, $ops, $mem,
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SODIUM_CRYPTO_PWHASH_ALG_ARGON2ID13);
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$nonce = random_bytes(SODIUM_CRYPTO_SECRETBOX_NONCEBYTES);
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$sealed = sodium_crypto_secretbox($this->masterKey, $nonce, $kek);
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sodium_memzero($kek);
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return [
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'v' => 1,
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'salt' => sodium_bin2base64($salt, SODIUM_BASE64_VARIANT_ORIGINAL),
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'ops' => $ops,
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'mem' => $mem,
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'nonce' => sodium_bin2base64($nonce, SODIUM_BASE64_VARIANT_ORIGINAL),
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'key' => sodium_bin2base64($sealed, SODIUM_BASE64_VARIANT_ORIGINAL),
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];
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}
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/**
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* Open a key field that is either one wrapped key or {"slots": [{slot, label, key}, ...]}:
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* every slot holds the same master key under its own passphrase.
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*/
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public static function unwrapAny(array $field, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $passphrase): self {
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if (!isset($field['slots'])) {
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return self::unwrap($field, $passphrase);
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}
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foreach ($field['slots'] as $slot) {
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try {
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return self::unwrap($slot['key'], $passphrase);
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} catch (CryptoException) {
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}
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}
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throw new CryptoException('Wrong passphrase or damaged key');
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}
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/** @param array{v:int, salt:string, ops:int, mem:int, nonce:string, key:string} $wrapped */
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public static function unwrap(array $wrapped, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $passphrase): self {
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$b64 = static fn (string $s): string => sodium_base642bin($s, SODIUM_BASE64_VARIANT_ORIGINAL);
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$kek = sodium_crypto_pwhash(SODIUM_CRYPTO_SECRETBOX_KEYBYTES, $passphrase, $b64($wrapped['salt']),
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$wrapped['ops'], $wrapped['mem'], SODIUM_CRYPTO_PWHASH_ALG_ARGON2ID13);
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$master = sodium_crypto_secretbox_open($b64($wrapped['key']), $b64($wrapped['nonce']), $kek);
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sodium_memzero($kek);
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if ($master === false) {
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throw new CryptoException('Wrong passphrase or damaged key');
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}
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return new self($master);
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}
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public function __destruct() {
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sodium_memzero($this->masterKey);
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sodium_memzero($this->dataKey);
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sodium_memzero($this->hashKey);
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}
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}
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